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The past two decades have witnessed an explosion in the
popularity of "voluntary" environmental regulation that provides
incentives- but not mandates -for pollution control. Advocates
claim that such regulationholds particularpromise in developing
countries where conventional command-and-controlpolicies often
perform poorly. Yet evaluative research on voluntary regulation
has focused almost exclusively on industrialized countries. This
article presents a case study of four high-profile voluntary
environmental agreements used during the 1980s and 1990s in
an attempt to control pollution from leather tanneries in Le6n,
Guanajuato-Mexico's leather goods capital and a notorious
environmental hotspot. To understand why environmental
authorities made voluntary agreements the centerpiece of their
pollution control efforts in Le6n, and why this approach
ultimately failed, we reconstruct the history of the voluntary
agreements along with that of local, state, and federal
environmental regulatory capacity. Juxtaposing these two
timelines suggests that the four voluntary agreements were both
motivated by - and eventually undermined by - gaps in the legal,
institutional, physical, and civic infrastructures that regulators
needed to implement command-and-controlpolicies. To the extent
that our findings may be generalized, they imply that voluntary
regulation is not likely to be an effective means of shoring up
poorly performing command-and-control regimes in developing
countries.
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INTRODUCTION
The conventional command-and-control approach to industrial
environmental management is to establish laws requiring firms to cut
emissions.' So-called voluntary regulation, by contrast, provides
incentives-but not mandates-for pollution control. In industrialized
countries, the popularity of voluntary regulation has exploded over the
past two decades. For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection
2
Agency now administers 133 voluntary programs.
A considerable literature examines voluntary regulation in
industrialized countries. 3 Although explanations are varied, a recurrent
theme is that regulators resort to voluntary approaches when they lack
the wherewithal to mandate emissions reductions. For example, Lyon
argues that U.S. regulators have relied solely on voluntary programs to
address climate change because political support for mandatory
greenhouse gas emissions controls is weak.4 As for firms, the literature
suggests that they participate in voluntary programs either because
regulators offer inducements such as positive publicity, technical
assistance, and regulatory relief or, more commonly, because regulators
implicitly threaten sanctions. An article by Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett,
suggests that firms may collectively volunteer for self-regulation in order
to preempt even more restrictive mandatory standards. 5 Similarly, in an
article by Segerson and Miceli, a "background legislative threat"
6
motivates participation in voluntary environmental agreements.
Empirical research demonstrates that the track record of voluntary
7
regulation in industrialized countries is decidedly mixed.

1.

See THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL IN ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICY, at xv (Gloria E. Helfand & Peter Berck eds., 2003).
2. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVERYDAY CHOICES: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP 7 (2005).

3. See generally Kathryn Harrison, Talking with the Donkey: Cooperative Approaches to
Environmental Protection, 2 J. INDUS. ECOLOGY 51 (1999); Madhu Khanna, Non-Mandatory
Approaches to Environmental Protection, 15 J.ECON. SURVS. 291 (2001); Thomas P. Lyon &
John W. Maxwell, "Voluntary" Approaches to Environmental Regulation, in ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Maurizio Franzini & Antonio Nicita eds.,

2002).
4. THOMAS P. LYON, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, RFF 1B 03-01, VOLUNTARY VERSUS
MANDATORY APPROACHES TO CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 2 (2003).

5. See John W. Maxwell et al., Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The PoliticalEconomy of
CorporateEnvironmentalism, 43 J.L. & ECON. 583 (2000).
6. Kathleen Segerson & Thomas J. Miceli, Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or
Bad News for Environmental Protection?,36 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109,111 (1998).
7. See generally Andrew A. King & Michael J.Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without
Sanctions: The Chemical Industry'sResponsible Care Program,43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 698 (2000).
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While comprehensive data do not exist, scattered studies
indicate that, like their counterparts in the west, regulators in developing
countries are increasingly relying on voluntary regulation. For example,
environmental authorities in Colombia negotiated over 50 voluntary
compacts with industrial associations between 1995 and 2003, and in
Mexico, ten such agreements involving over 600 firms were signed
during the 1990s.8 Proponents tout voluntary regulation as a promising
strategy for shoring up command-and-control regimes in developing
countries that, historically, have performed poorly.9
Despite the growing popularity and alleged benefits of
voluntary regulation in developing countries, literature on the topic is
quite thin. Little is known about the reasons regulators in developing
countries use voluntary regulation, its effectiveness, and the drivers of
success and failure. To help fill this gap, this article presents a Mexican
case study. We focus on the city of Le6n, Guanajuato, where pollution
from hundreds of tanneries and leather goods factories has earned the
city an international reputation as an environmental hotspot. 10 The
centerpiece of efforts to control tannery pollution during the 1980s and
1990s was a series of four high-profile voluntary agreements, each
backed by top federal, state, and local authorities.1 Unfortunately, these
agreements yielded few concrete results. Why did regulators resort to
voluntary regulation to control tannery pollution in Le6n, and why did
this approach fail?

8.

ALLEN BLACKMAN ET AL., RES. FOR THE FUTURE, ASSESSMENT OF COLUMBIA'S

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEM (SINA) 81-82 (2005); Jonathon Hanks, A Role for
Negotiated Environmental Agreements in Developing Countries?, in VOLUNTARY
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: PROCESS, PRACTICE AND FUTURE USE 159, 165 (Patrick ten

Brink ed., 2002). See also Jorge Rivera, Assessing a Voluntary Environmental Initiative in the
Developing World: The Costa Rican Certification for Sustainable Tourism, 35 POL'Y SCd. 333
(2002); VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: PROCESS, PRACTICE AND FUTURE USE
155-240 (Patrick ten Brink ed., 2002).
9. Hanks, supra note 8, at 160. See also WORLD BANK, GREENING INDUSTRY: NEW ROLES
FOR COMMUNITIES, MARKETS, AND GOVERNMENTS 82-94 (2000).
10. See, e.g., COMM'N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION SECRETARIAT, CEC SECRETARIAT
REPORT ON THE DEATH OF MIGRATORY BIRDS AT THE SILVA RESERVOIR (1994-95), at 1 (1995).
11. SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y ECOLOGIA, CONVENIO REALIZADO PARA
PREVENIR Y CONTROLAR LA CONTAMINACION DE LA INDUSTRIA CURTIDORA EN LEON, GTO. Y
SU AREA METROPOLITANA [COVENANT TO PREVENT & CONTROL CONTAMINATION BY THE
TANNERY INDUSTRY] (1987) [hereinafter Convenio I]; CONVENIO DE CONCERTACION PARA UN
PROGRAMA INTEGRAL DE SANEAMIENTO DEL AMBIENTE EVITANDO LA CONTAMINACION
GENERADA POR LAS ACTIVIDADES DE LA CURTIDURIA EN EL MUNICIPIO DE LEON (1991)
[hereinafter Convenio II]; ACTA DE LA QUINTA SESION ORDINARIA DE LA COMISION PARA EL

SANEAMIENTO INTEGRAL DEL RIO TURBIO (1995) [hereinafter Convenio III]; CONVENIO DE
COORDINACION Y CONCERTACION (1997) [hereinafter Convenio IV]
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We argue that voluntary pollution control efforts in Le6n were
both motivated by-and undermined by-gaps in the four types of
"regulatory infrastructure": (1) "legal infrastructure" such as regulations
implementing federal and state environmental laws; (2) "institutional
infrastructure" such as state and municipal environmental management
agencies; (3) "physical infrastructure" including liquid and solid waste
treatment facilities; and (4) "civic infrastructure" such as environmental
advocacy groups and an environmentally aware citizenry. A lack of
these four types of infrastructure at federal, state, and municipal levels
effectively ruled out reliance on conventional command-and-control
regulations such as mandatory emissions and technology standards. 12
Environmental authorities attempted to overcome this constraint by
negotiating voluntary agreements with the tanning industry in which
both authorities and tanners agreed to implement various pollution
control measures by specified deadlines.
A lack of regulatory infrastructure also undermined these
voluntary agreements. It did so in at least three ways. First, it implied
that the tanners who acceded to the agreements needed to construct
much of the requisite physical infrastructure from scratch. Tanners were
not likely to make such investments without strong incentives. Second, it
implied that regulators could not credibly threaten the tanning industry
with mandatory command-and-control regulation in the event that firms
failed to comply with their voluntary commitments-the "stick" often
thought to be responsible for successful voluntary agreements. Finally,
the lack of a wide range of elements of regulatory infrastructure, many of
which were interdependent (for example, a competent local enforcement
institution and clear written regulations), implied that most, if not all, of
the key signatories to the voluntary agreements needed to
simultaneously make good on their commitments in order for the
agreement to be successful. This situation inevitably led to bottlenecks
and finger pointing.
The methodology for our analysis is qualitative and historical.
We use a variety of sources -including an original survey of 137
tanneries in Le6n, interviews with key local stakeholders, and primary as
12. Lack of regulatory infrastructure has also ruled out reliance on less conventional
economic incentive pollution control instruments such as emissions charges and tradable
permits. Economic incentive instruments are generally considered to be at least as
demanding of regulatory infrastructure as command-and-control instruments and have a
spotty record in developing countries. See, e.g., Allen Blackman & Winston Harrington, The
Use of Economic Incentives in Developing Countries: Lessons from International Experience with
Industrial Air Pollution, 9 J. ENV'T & DEV. 5 (2000); RUTH GREENSPAN BELL, ORG. FOR ECON.
COOPERATION & DEV., CHOOSING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN THE REAL
WORLD 12-13 (2003) (prepared for OECD Global Forum on Sustainable Development).
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well as secondary documents-to reconstruct two histories: that of
pollution control in Le6n between 1980 and 2001 and that of
environmental regulatory capacity at the federal level, the state level (in
Guanajuato), and the municipal level (in Le6n) during the same time
period. We analyze and juxtapose these two histories using the four
categories of regulatory infrastructure listed above as an organizing
framework.
The article is organized as follows. Section 1 presents
background information on the leather tanning sector in Le6n, including
its economic importance and environmental impacts. Section II discusses
the evolution of environmental regulatory capacity at the national, state,
and local levels from 1980 to 2001. Section III presents a brief history of
efforts to control tannery pollution, focusing on the voluntary
environmental agreements of 1987, 1991, 1995, and 1997. Finally, section
IV summarizes our findings and considers their policy implications.
I. LEATHER TANNING IN LEON
A. Economic Profile
Located in the state of Guanajuato in north-central Mexico, Le6n
is a sprawling industrial city of 1.1 million inhabitants. 13 The city
produces 63 percent of Mexico's tanned leather and is known as the
country's leather goods capital. 14 Leather tanning and leather goods
manufacturing- most notably shoemaking- dominate the city's
15
economy, providing 64 percent of its manufacturing jobs.
16
According to official statistics, Le6n is home to 859 tanneries.
The real number is higher, however, because many tanneries are
13. INST1TUTO NACIONAL DE ESTADISTICA, GEOGRAFIA E INFORMATICA [NAT'L INST. OF
STATISTICS, GEOGRAPHY & COMPUTING], XI CENSO GENERAL DE POBLACION Y VIVIENDA
[12TH GEN'L POPULATION & HOUSING CENSUS] (2000), http://www.inegi.gob.mx/inegi/

default.asp.
14. INSTmTUTO NACIONAL DE ESTADISTICA, GEOGRAFA E INFORMATICA [NAT'L INST. OF
STATISTICS, GEOGRAPHY AND COMPUTING], CENSOS ECON6MICOS [ECONOMIC CENSUS]

(1999), http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/default.asp?c=6340 [hereinafter ECONOMIC CENSUS].
The figure is obtained by comparing the municipality's production value to the national
total for code 3161 of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). See
NAT'L TECHNICAL INFO. SERV., NORTH AMERICAN INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM (2002),

http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/naics.html.
15. ECONOMIC CENSUS, supra note 14. The figure is obtained by comparing
employment for NAICS codes 3161 and 31-32-33 for the municipality.
16. Id. The figure is the number of establishments for NAICS code 3161 for the
municipality. Some tanneries are also located in the much smaller neighboring cities of San
Francisco del Rinc6n and Purisima del Rinc6n. To make the analysis more manageable, we
have restricted our attention to the city of Le6n.
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"informal" -unlicensed and unregistered -a status that enables them to
evade tax authorities and other regulators. Guanajuato's environmental
regulatory authority estimates that approximately 400 informal tanneries
are scattered throughout the city. 17 Although data on the size
distribution of Le6n's tanneries are somewhat confused, the vast
majority of tanneries are small in scale. 18 The large number, small size,
dispersion, and informality of Le6n's tanneries make them a difficult
target for regulatory authorities. In addition, the leather industry's status
as the economic mainstay of the region affords it considerable public
support and political power19
B. Environmental Impacts
Leather tanning generates liquid wastes containing salt, sulfur,
and chromium and dissolved solids and high levels of chemical and
biological oxygen demand. 20 Tanning also generates solid wastes, mainly
sludge, trimmings, and fleshings. 21 Sludge, which accumulates in the
sedimentation tanks tanneries employ to keep drain pipes from clogging,
contains hazardous pollutants, including sulfur, phosphorous, and
chromium VI, a highly toxic byproduct of the chromium III used in the
tanning process. 22
17. Interview with J.L. Villalobos, Subprocurador de Verificaci6n Normativa,
Procuraduria de Protecci6n al Ambiente del Estado de Guanajuato (PPAEG), in
Guanajuato, Gto., Mex. (Jan. 27,1999).
18. A study in the early 1990s found that 96 percent of a sample of 583 tanneries had 16
or fewer employees. Carl R. Bartone & Livia Benavides, Local Management of Hazardous
Wastes from Small-Scale and Cottage Industries, 15 WASTE MGMT. & RESEARCH 3, 9 (1997). A
January 2000 survey of 137 tanneries in Le6n found that the average tannery employed 16
workers and produced 499 semi-finished hides per week. See Allen Blackman, Small Firms
and Clean Technologies: Part II: Leather Tanning in Le6n, Mexico, in SMALL FIRMS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: COLLECTIVE IMPACTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION 191,
194 (Allen Blackman ed., 2006).
19. Interview with A. Azuela, Former Director, Procuraduria de Protecci6n al
Ambiente (PROFEPA), in Austin, Tex. (May 6, 2002); Interview with Jos6 Angel Oyarvide
Polo, Former Delegado, PROFEPA, in Le6n, Gto., Mex. (May 31, 2002); Interview with M.
Hemndez, Director de Verificaci6n Normativa, PPAEG, in Guanajuato, Gto., Mex. (May
29,2002).
20. U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME & INDUS. & ENV'T OFF., TECHNICAL REP. SERIES No. 4,
TANNERIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A TECHNICAL GUIDE 21-22, U.N. Sales No. E.91.III.D.1
(1991). Collectively, Le6n's tanneries emit roughly 43,000 tons of total dissolved solids and
500 tons of chromium per year. Bartone & Benavides, supranote 18, at 9.
21. U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME & INDUS. & ENV'T OFF., supra note 20, at 21.
22. U.N. Indus. Dev. Org. [UNIDO], Technical Report: Sources, Detection and Avoidance of
Hexavalent Chromium in Leather and Leather Products, 2, U.N. Doc. US/RAS/92/120 (Aug.
1999). Collectively, Le6n's tanneries generate approximately 200 tons of sludge per day.
Guevara E. Socorro, Comenzarfa a operar el Parque de Lodos el prdximo lunes, aunque atn no se
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Although tannery liquid and solid wastes are highly polluting,
almost all are uncontrolled and untreated. Virtually all of Le6n's
tanneries lack pollution-control equipment aside from sedimentation
tanks. 23 Thus, tannery liquid wastes are discharged untreated into
municipal sewers. Until late 2000, when Le6n's first municipal
wastewater treatment plant began operation, these wastes flowed
untreated into the Turbio River (also known as the Gomz River in the
vicinity of Leon). Like most Mexican cities, Le6n has no hazardous waste
disposal facilities. 24 Until 2001, tannery sludge was dumped directly into
the Turbio River just outside the city by the companies hired by the
tanneries to empty their sedimentation tanks.25
Pollution from Le6n's tanneries degrades surface-water quality.
The state water authority classified the Turbio River as the most
contaminated in Guanajuato and as unfit for any type of use.26 In 1997,
the Federal Environmental Attorney General's Office, (Procuraduria
Federal de Protecci6n al Ambiente (PROFEPA)), carried out a detailed
analysis of a site just downstream from Le6n. It found levels of
chromium III and chromium IV in the river hundreds of times above the
27
maximum federal standards.

tiene autorizaci6n [Parque de Lodos Would Start Operating Next Monday Without
Authorization], CORREO, May 17,2000, at 23.
23. Bartone & Benavides, supra note 18, at 9-10. Of 137 tanneries surveyed in January
2000, none had wastewater treatment systems. Blackman, supra note 18, at 192-93.
24. The nearest hazardous waste disposal facility is 800 kilometers away in Mina,
Nuevo Le6n, near Monterrey.
25. Guevara E. Socorro, Autoridades FederalesInterpondrdnDemanda Penal ContraCICUR
[FederalAuthorities to Interpose Sanction Against CICUR], CORREO, May 21, 2000, at 19.
26. COMISION ESTATAL DE AGUA Y SANEAMIENTO DE GUANAJUATO, PLAN ESTATAL
HIDRAULICO DE GUANAJUATO 2000-2005: DIAGNOSTICO DE LA SrrUACION HIDRAULICA DEL
ESTADO DE GUANAJUATO Y ESTRATEGIA EN MATERIA DE AGUA [GUANAJUATO STATE
HYDRAULIC PLAN 2000-2005: HYDRAULIC DIAGNOSTIC & WATER STRATEGY] 91 (1999).

27. Interview with Jose Angel Oyarvide, supra note 19. Tanneries also contribute to
groundwater degradation. Chromium contamination of Le6n's drinking water wells has
been documented since at least the mid 1980s, although authorities at the time did not seem
to be concerned. See Federico Velio Ortega, No Representan Peligro los Residuos de Cromo en el
Agua [Chromium Residue in Water Does Not Present Danger], EL NACIONAL, Apr. 17, 1987, at
3. Later studies suggest that the problem is significant, although tanneries are only one of
several sources of chromium that contaminate the aquifer. M.A. Armienta et al.,
GroundwaterPollution with Chromium in Leon Valley, Mexico, 54 INT'L J. ENVTL. ANALYTICAL
CHEMISTRY 1, 12-13 (1993).
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY
CAPACITY
To understand how gaps in regulatory infrastructure have
impeded pollution control efforts in Le6n, this section sketches the
evolution of environmental regulatory capacity at the federal, state, and
municipal levels over the past several decades. Figure 1 highlights
milestones in this evolution.
A. Federal
1. General Laws and Institutions.
The evolution of Mexico's federal environmental infrastructure
has been complex and somewhat circuitous. The country's first
comprehensive environmental law was passed in 1971.28 However,
federal environmental regulatory authority was weak during the 1970s. 29
It was split among several agencies -chiefly the Secretariat of Health
and Welfare (Secretarfa de Salubridad y Asistencia) and the Secretariat of
Hydraulic Resources (Secretaria de Recursos Hidrdulicos), Secretariat of
Agriculture and Cattle Ranching (Secretaria de Agricultura y Ganaderia),
and Secretariat of Industry and Commerce (Secretaria de Industria y
Comercio) - none of which was devoted principally to environmental
regulation.30 In 1982, new federal environmental legislation superseded
the 1971 law but did little to address this problem. 31 The creation of a
new federal department, the Secretariat of Urban Development and
Ecology (Secretariade Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologia (SEDUE)), at the end of
1982 signaled a first attempt at unifying federal environmental
32
authority.

28. Ley Federal para Prevenir y Controlar la Contaminaci6n Ambiental [Law for the
Prevention & Control of Environmental Contamination], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n
[D.O.], 23 de Marzo de 1971 (Mex.) [hereinafter L.F.P.C.C.A.].
29. Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Summary of Environmental Law in Mexico,
http://www.cec.org/pubsjinfo resources/lawtreat-agree/ summary-envirolaw/public
ation/mxdoc.cfm?varlan=english&topic=1 (follow "chapter 2" hyperlink; then examine
"Historical Background").
30. L.F.P.C.C.A., supra note 28, § 5o.
31. Ley Federal de Protecci6n al Ambiente [L.F.P.A.] [Environmental Protection Law],
Primera Secci6n, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.C.] § 5, 11 de Enero de 1982 (Mex.).
32. SEDUE was still required to coordinate the formulation and application of
environmental policy with SSA, however. Ley Org&nica de la Administraci6n Pfiblica
Federal [L.O.A.P.F.], as reformed and amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.C.] § 37-XV,
29 de Diciembre de 1982 (Mex.).
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The institutional capacity needed to implement federal
environmental laws at the state and municipal levels has been slow to
develop. Such gaps in local administrative capacity are pervasive in
Mexico-since its inception, a defining characteristic of Mexican
government has been a concentration of legal authority, power, and
resources at the federal level. 33 In the early 1980s, recognizing that this
concentration of power and resources in Mexico City was impeding
effective provision of all sorts of public services, including
environmental protection, Mexico initiated a gradual process of
transferring certain responsibilities to states and municipalities. 34 Known
as "decentralization," this process, which included amendments to the
Mexican Constitution in 1987, resulted in the requirement that the
federal government adopt legislation granting state and municipal
35
governments some authority over environmental matters.
New, comprehensive federal environmental legislation passed in
1988- the General Law of Ecological Balance and Protection of the
Environment (Ley General del Equilibrio Ecol6gico y la Protecci6n al
Ambiente (LGEEPA)) - established a new division of responsibilities
36
between federal and local (state and municipal) governments.
Although the LGEEPA, which remains in force today, left considerable
room for interpretation in determining the scope of federal control, it
drew the following broad distinctions. The federal government alone
was charged with handling effluents discharged into national waters (in
practice, virtually all surface and ground water) as well as hazardous
wastes, while local governments were charged with regulating non37
hazardous solid wastes and discharges into municipal sewer systems.
Several changes in federal environmental regulatory institutions
in the late 1980s and early 1990s complemented the LGEEPA. The
National Water Commission (Comisi6n Nacional del Agua (CNA)) was
created in 1989. Housed in the Secretariat of Agriculture and
33. Donna Lybecker & Steven P. Mumme, Decentralizationand Environmental Protection
on Mexico's Northern and Southern Boundaries,11 J. ENV'T & DEV. 402,412 (2002).
34. Id.
35. Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, supranote 29, at 2.
36. Ley General del Equilibrio Ecol6gico y la Protecci6n al Ambiente [Environment
Protection Law], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.] capitulo II, 28 de Enero de 1988
(Mex.) [hereinafter L.G.E.E.].
37. ENvTL. LAW INsT., ELI PROJECT No. 931500, DECENTRALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN MExICO: AN OVERVIEW OF STATE AND LOCAL INSTITUTIONS, at iii, 14-15

(1996). For other areas such as air pollution and environmental impact review, federal and
local governments were to divide jurisdiction based on factors such as the location and
nature of the source and the severity of pollution. Id. The LGEEPA also conferred upon
states and municipalities all environmental powers within their jurisdictions not expressly
reserved to the federal government. Id.
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Hydrological Resources (Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos
(SARH)) rather than SEDUE, the CNA assumed jurisdiction over water
quantity and water quality issues including enforcing standards on
38
industrial discharges and wastewater treatment.
The federal environmental regulatory system was restructured
in 1992. SEDUE was recast as the Secretariat of Social Development
(Secretaria de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL)). Within SEDESOL, one subsecretariat, the Federal Environmental Attorney General's Office
(PROFEPA) was charged with enforcement, and a second, the National
Institute of Ecology (Instituto Nacional de Ecologia (INE)) was charged
39
with standard setting.
In 1994, the environmental bureaucracy was restructured yet
again in order to streamline federal policy making. The key change was
to create a new agency called the Secretariat of the Environment, Natural
Resources and Fisheries (Secretariade Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales
y Pesca (SEMARNAP)), which amalgamated all of the key federal offices
and agencies related to the environment and natural resources, including
offices formerly housed at SEDESOL, the CNA, and agencies concerned
with fisheries and forests. 4°
In 1996, LGEEPA was reformed to further decentralize environmental responsibilities, establish a right of access to environmental
information, and modernize regulation by, among other things,
promoting multimedia integrated permitting. 41 The most recent major
change in federal environmental infrastructure occurred in 2000 when
the Fox administration stripped SEMANAP of its jurisdiction over
fisheries and renamed the agency the Secretariat of the Environment and
Natural Resources (Secretarfa de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales
(SEMARNAT)).42
2. HazardousWaste and Water Pollution Law and Institutions
From the point of view of controlling tannery pollution, the most
important aspects of federal environmental law are the provisions
covering hazardous wastes and liquid effluents. Regarding hazardous
waste, one development was critical, the 1993 promulgation of several
federal regulations (Normas Oficiales Mexicanas (NOMs)) implementing
Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, supra note 29, at 2.
Id.
Id.
41.
ORG. FOR EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS:
MExico 47 (1998).
38.
39.
40.

42.

ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS:

MExico 127 (2003).
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various provisions of the 1988 LGEEPA.43 These NOMs classify the solid
wastes from selected industrial processes - including leather tanning - as
"hazardous" and spell out requisite handling, management, and
disposal procedures. 44 Other regulations spelled out how such wastes
were to be handled, stored, and managed. According to state level
regulators in Le6n, prior to these 1993 NOMs, hazardous waste
regulation was so piecemeal and confused as to be incomprehensible and
45
virtually useless to enforcement authorities.
With regard to water pollution, as noted above, under the 1988
LGEEPA, the federal government-through the CNA-is charged with
regulating discharges into all national waters, while local governments
are charged with regulating discharges into public sewer systems. For
both federal and local authorities, regulation consists of establishing
effluent standards (for example, maximum allowable limits for
pollutants), issuing permits, keeping an inventory of dischargers and
discharges, collecting discharge fees, monitoring compliance with
permits, and sanctioning violations. 46 As with hazardous waste, prior to
the early 1990s, federal laws governing water quality were confused and,
therefore, often ignored at the local level. In Le6n, for example,
according to state regulators, there was absolutely no effort on the part
of any regulatory authority to enforce effluent standards until the
1990s. 47

In 1997 and 1998, two comprehensive federal regulations greatly
mitigated this confusion by replacing the pre-existing system of
industry-specific federal standards with a simplified system of effluent
standards for all types of emissions sources. The first regulation
established standards for discharges into national waters by all types of
sources including municipal sewerage authorities. 4 The second
regulation applied to discharges into municipal sewer systems. 49 To give
municipal authorities time to build the physical, legal, and institutional
43. L.G.E.E., supra note 36, capitulo IV, § VI.
44. Norma Oficial Mexicana [NOM-CRP-001-ECOL/93], Diario Oficial de la
Federaci6n [D.O.], Anexo 2, § 4.2, 22 de Octubre de 1993 (Mex.); Norma Oficial Mexicana
[NOM-CRP-006-ECOL/93], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 22 de Octubre de 1993
(Mex.).

45. Interview with M. Hernndez, supra note 19.
46. See Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, supra note 29, at 9; ORG. FOR
OPERATION & DEv., supra note 41, at 64.
47. Interview with Carlos Oliverio Pantoja, Director de Techologia
Universidad Tecnol6gica de Le6n, inLe6n, Gto., Mex. (May 30,2002).
48. Norma Oficial Mexicana [NOM-001-ECOL-1996], Diario Oficial de la
[DO.], 6 de Enero de 1997 (Mex.).
49. Norma Oficial Mexicana [NOM-002-ECOL-1996], Diario Oficial de la
[D.O.], 3 de Junio de 1998 (Mex.).

ECON. COAmbiental,
Federaci6n
Federaci6n

1018

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

infrastructure needed to meet those standards, the two regulations
established grace periods for compliance that depended on the size of
the city.50 Large cities like Le6n were given until 2000 to comply with
effluent standards for discharges into national waters and until 1999 to
5
comply with effluent standards for discharges into municipal sewers. '
Municipalities were charged with establishing industry-specific
standards for discharges into their sewer systems.5 2 The regulations
provided guidelines for such standards.5 3
B. State
Although the 1988 LGEEPA established a legal foundation for
the transfer of environmental authority to the local level, actual
decentralization has occurred slowly as a result of limited resources at
the local level, along with the low priority that many states give
environmental issues.54 The first step in environmental decentralization
was for states to pass their own comprehensive environmental laws. 55
Guanajuato, Le6n's home state, passed such laws in 1990.56 The next step
was to establish state-level regulatory institutions. Although Guanajuato
founded a water regulatory authority-the Guanajuato State Water
Commission (Comisi6n Estatal del Agua de Guanajuato (CEAG)) -in 1991,
it did not establish an environmental enforcement agency (Procuraduria
de Protecci6n al Ambiente del Estado de Guanajuato(PPAEG)) or a standard
setting organization (Instituto de Ecologia del Estado de Guanajuato (IEEG))
until 1996.57 Unfortunately, PPAEG has been chronically under funded
and under manned. From 1997 to 2002, it employed a total of seven
8
inspectors and had an operating budget of less than $500,000 per year.5
In addition, questions have been raised about the PPAEG's
independence. According to federal regulators, PPAEG has often taken

50. NOM-001-ECOL-1996 § 4.5b; NOM-002-ECOL-1996 § 3.5.
51. Id.
52. Norma Oficial Mexicana [NOM-002-ECOL-1996], supranote 49, § 4.9.
53. Id.
54. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 41, at 144; Lybecker & Mumme,
supra note 33, at 414.
55. Lybecker & Mumme, supra note 33, at 413.
56. Decreto Nfimero 127 [Decree Number 127], PERIODICO OFICIAL DEL ESTADO DE
GUANAJUATO, 28 de Agosto 1990 (Mex).
57. Decreto Niirnero 16, Peri6dico oficial del estado de Guanajuato, no. 15, parte H, at
1230, 20 de febrero de 1996 (Mex.); Decreto Nfimero 28, peri6dico oficial del estado de
Guanajuato, no. 39, parte II, 14 de mayo de 1996 (Mex.).
58. Interview with Jose Angel Oyarvide, supranote 19.
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the side of the powerful industrial lobbies (notably tanners) in disputes
about compliance with federal environmental agencies. 59
C. Municipal
Decentralization of environmental authority permeated to the
municipal level in the early 1990s. The city of Le6n passed its first
environmental regulation in 1991. 60 The following year, it established a
Municipal Ecology Commission, which was renamed the Environment
and Ecology Office (Direcci6n de Medio Ambiente y Ecologfa del Municipio
de Le6n) in 1994.61
The city of Le6n has regulatory authority for one type of tannery
pollution: discharges of liquid effluents into municipal sewers. 62 The city
built the legal infrastructure needed to regulate this pollution during the
1980s and 1990s; it established a formal water and sewer authority
(Sistema de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Le6n (SAPAL)) in 1985. 63 In
principal, SAPAL was responsible for regulating discharges into the
city's sewers to meet federal standards. However, as discussed earlier,
federal guidelines for regulating industrial discharges into municipal
sewers were not established until 1997, and the city of Le6n did not
promulgate such regulations until 1998. 64 The 1998 regulations rely
mainly upon command-and-control approaches, namely permitting and
discharge standards for over a dozen specific pollutants. 65
59. Interview with A. Azuela, supra note 19; Interview with Josk Angel Oyarvide, supra
note 19.
60. Reglamento Municipal para el Control de la Calidad Ambiental en la Ciudad de
Le6n, Guanajuato [Municipal Regulations for the Control of Air Quality in Le6n,
Guanajuato], PERIODICO OFICIAL DEL ESTADO DE GUANAJUATO § 2, 17 de Diciembre 1991

(Mex.).
61. Reglamento de la Comisi6n Municipal de Ecologla de la Ciudad de Le6n,
Guanajuato [Regulations for the Municipal Ecology Commission of Le6n, Guanajuato],
PER16DICO OFICIAL DEL ESTADO DE GUANAJUATO, 3 de Marzo 1992 (Mex.); Acuerdo por

virtud del cual, se define Ia Competencia de Ia Direcci6n del Medio Ambiente y Ecologla
del Municipio de Le6n, Guanajuato [Agreement to Define the Environment and Ecology
Office of Le6n, Guanajuato] PERIODICO OFICIAL DEL ESTADO DE GUANAJUATO § 2, 30 de
Diciembre 1994 (Mex.).
62. See ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 37, at 25.
63. Reglamento de Uso de la Red de Alcantarillado del Sistema de Agua Potable y
Alcantarillado de Le6n, Gto. [Regulations for the Use of the Municipal Sewage Network for
Potable and Waste Water of Ieon, Guanajuato], PERIODICO OFICIAL DEL ESTADO DE
GUANAJUATO 9 de Abril 1985 (Mex.).
64. See Reglamento de Uso de la Red de Alcantarillado del Sistema de Agua Potable y
Alcantarillado de Le6n, Gto. [Regulations for the Use of the Municipal Sewage Network for
Potable and Waste Water of LLon, Guanajuato] § 2, 1998 PERIODICO OFICIAL DEL ESTADO DE
GUANAJUATO 3 de Febrero1998 (Mex.).
65. Id.
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In addition to controlling tannery discharges into the sewer
system, the municipal government of Le6n is also responsible for
meeting federal standards for discharges from the sewer system into the
Turbio River. 66 In order to meet these standards, the city needed to
construct and operate a wastewater treatment plant. SAPAL tendered
bids for the construction and operation of such a plant in late 1992 and
granted a contract to ECOSYS III, a private German-Mexican consortium,
in 1994.67 Unfortunately, the Mexican financial crisis of 1994 and 1995
significantly delayed the project, and the plant did not come on line until
the fall of 2000. 68
In 2000, a second municipal treatment facility was opened, the
Parque de Lodos, a solid waste treatment center built, financed, and
operated by the Guanajuato State Tannery Chamber of Commerce
(Camara de la Industria de Curtiduria del Estado de Guanajuato (CICUR)).
The facility has very little infrastructure or management. Essentially a
collection of simple open-air pits, it provides no protection against
69
seepage and groundwater contamination.
In addition to the mandates contained in the 1998 regulation on
use of the municipal sewer system, as discussed below, the city of Le6n
has attempted to control tannery pollution by creating incentives for
certain types of tanneries to relocate to specified sectors of the city. 70 The
land use zoning needed for this approach was put in place in 1998, the
71
same year that the sewer system regulations were finally passed.
However, the 1998 regulation mostly enshrined the existing patchwork
of land uses rather than reshaping them into more desirable patterns.
III. HISTORY OF POLLUTION CONTROL EFFORTS
A. Heightened Demand for Pollution Control
Developments on the national, regional, and local level
dramatically boosted demand for environmental quality in Le6n in the
66. L.G.E.E., supra note 36, art. 119.
67. Decreto Niimero 281 [Decree Number 281], 1994 PERIODICO OFICIAL DEL ESTADO DE
GUANAJUATO § 3, 17 de Marzo 1994 (Mex.).
68. See Rossana Aguilar Aguirre, Fue Inaugurada Planta de Tratamiento de Aguas
Residuales [Waste Water Treatment Plant Is Inaugurated], CORREO DE HoY, 21 de Septiembre,
at 21 (Mex.).
69. Socorro Guevara, Aun no Concluye la Primera Etapa del Parque de Lodos [The First
Stage of Sludge ParkIs Not Completed], CORREO DE Hoy, 30 de Mayo 2000, at 21 (Mex.).
70. Convenio II, supra note 11, at 4; Convenio IV, supra note 11, §§ 10i-101.
71. Regalamento de Zonificaci6n y Usos del Suelo de Municipio de Le6n, Gto.
periodico oficial del estado de Guanajuato, no. 10, parte 111, at 1034, 3 de febrero 1998
(Mex.).
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mid-1980s and gave rise to the city's first concerted efforts to control
tannery pollution. Several of these developments relate to the institutional and legal evolution discussed above. On the national level, an
important impetus was the creation of an improved legal and
institutional infrastructure for environmental management, most notably
the passage of the 1982 Federal Law for the Protection of the
Environment and the creation of SEDUE. 72 On the regional level, an
important driver was an effort to improve surface-water quality in the
severely polluted Lerma-Chapala River basin and to restore Lake
Chapala, Mexico's largest lake. 73 The federal and state bureaucrats who
focused their attention on this issue in the mid-1980s viewed untreated
industrial and municipal discharges emanating from Le6n-the largest
population and industrial center in the northern section of the river
basin-as a major contributor to the problem. 74 On the local level,
concern about tannery pollution was heightened by the establishment of
a municipal water and sewer authority, SAPAL, in 1985. SAPAL's first
order of business was to deal with the continual clogging of Le6n's
antiquated sewer system, which resulted from the high concentrations of
suspended solids in tannery liquid effluents. 7
B. Convenio I
1. Background
"Convenios" -voluntary written agreements among public- and
private-sector agents-are fairly common in Mexico and are often used
to promote coordination in areas where jurisdiction and legal
underpinnings are fuzzy. For example, SEMARNAT has signed
convenios with 25 of 32 state environmental authorities in order to
facilitate federal intervention where a state lacks the infrastructure or
resources needed to implement environmental regulations on its own. 76
Convenios are also signed to encourage polluters to improve their
environmental performance. For example, SEMARNAT has signed

72.
73.

See L.G.E.E., supra note 36, § 37-XV.
See Philippus Webster et al., Managing the Water Transition in the Lerma-Chapala

Basin, Mexico, in INTERSECTORAL MANAGEMENT OF RIVER BASINS 161 (Charles L. Abernathy
ed., 2001).

74. Interview with Carlos Oliverio, supra note 47; Interview with Jos( Angel Oyarvide,
supra note 19.
75. Interview with Carlos Oliverio, supra note 47.
76.

ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., supra note 41, at 144; ENVTL. LAW INST.,

supra note 37, at v.
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convenios with PEMEX, the state-owned oil giant, and with several
77
industry subsectors such as coffee processing and textiles.
As discussed in the introduction, we argue that the 1987
convenio with Le6n's tanning industry-like the three similar convenios
that followed it-represented an attempt to compensate for missing
legal, institutional, physical, and civic infrastructures that would
normally be used to control tannery pollution. The state of such
infrastructures at the time of the first convenio can be gleaned from
section II. With regard to legal infrastructure, Mexican hazardous waste
law was confused, and standards for industrial discharges into Le6n's
sewers had not yet been established. Very little institutional
infrastructure for environmental management existed at the local level.
As for physical infrastructure, no treatment facilities for liquid waste or
hazardous solid waste existed. Finally, concerning civic infrastructure,
there is little evidence to indicate that tanners were aware of their legal
responsibilities for environmental protection in 1987, nor is there any
evidence that tanners or the public were aware of the need to control
tannery pollution.
The first convenio was signed on July 8, 1987, by a collection of
federal, state, municipal, private-sector, and quasi-public institutions
including SEDUE, the state of Guanajuato, SAPAL, and Le6n's three
tannery trade associations. 78 Table 1 includes a complete list of
signatories. The convenio consists of 12 clauses that lay out the
obligations of the signatories in implementing a tannery pollution
control program for Le6n. The entire program was scheduled to be
completed in just 21 months.79 The main points of the convenio,
categorized according to the type of infrastructure they promote, are
described below and are summarized in Table 2.

77. ORG. FOR EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 461 at 72, 143; Hanks, supra note
8, at 165.
78. See Convenio I, supranote 11.
79. Id. cl. 12.
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Table 1. Convenio Signatories
Signatory
I
July
1987

Convenio
II
III
Oct.
June
1991
1995

Federal
Enviro.
Agency
(SEDUE
/
X
X
Xt
SEMARNAP)
Attny. General for Enviro. (PROFEPA)
Xt
n/a
n/a
Nat. Institute of Ecology (INE)
n/a
n/a
Ag. & Water Resources Agency
X
X
(SARI)
Secretariat of Health and Social
Security (SSSS)
National Water Commission (CNA)
X
Xt
State
State of Guanajuato Executive
X
X
X*
Health and Social Security Dept.
X
Development and Public Works Dept.
X
X
X
Water and Health (CEASG)
Institute of Ecology Gto. (IEEG)
n/a
n/a
State Attny. General for Enviro.
n/a
n/a
(PPAEG)
Municipal
X*
X
City of Le6n Executive
Water and Sewer Auth. Le6n (SAPAL)
X
X
City of San Francisco de Rinc6n
X
Executive
Water and Sewer Auth. S.F. de Rn.
n/a
n/a
X
(SAPAF)
City of Purisima del Rinc6n Executive
Water and Sewer Auth. Pur. del Rn.
n/a
n/a
(SAPAP)
Private-sector
X
X
Tanners trade assn. (CICUR)
X
X
Tanners trade assn. (ANACU)
Quimica Central de Mexico, S.A. de
C.V.
X
Nat.
Chamb.
Comm.,
Le6n
(CANACINTRA)
Parque PIEL
n/a
n/a
Fideiconiso Cd, Industrial de Le6n
Other
Leather research institute (CIATEC)
University of Guanajuato
Assn.
of
Leather
Professionals
(AQTCL)
Fundaci6n Ecol6gica de Gto., A.C.
(FUNDAE)
*Witness" only, not "participant"
tFederal office as "witness" only, state and regional offices as "participant"
n/a = not applicable as institution not yet established.

IV
March
1997
X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X
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2. Legal and InstitutionalInfrastructure
The three federal signatories -SEDUE, SARH, and the Health
and Social Security Agency (Secretarfa de Salud y Seguridad Social
(SSSS)) - were charged with establishing legal standards for tannery
liquid and solid wastes within five months of the signing of the
convenio. 80 SAPAL was charged with both enforcing emissions
standards to be promulgated by the federal signatories and meeting the
federal standards for municipal wastewater released into national waters
(including the Turbio River). 81 In addition, the convenio established a
new advisory committee called the Regional Committee for Promotion
and Technical Assistance (Comiti Regional de Promoci6n y Asesorfa
Tdcnica), comprised of representatives of the signatories of the
convenio. 82 The committee was made responsible for vetting specific
pollution control projects, evaluating compliance with the convenio,
submitting quarterly progress reports to SEDUE and SARH, and
modifying the cleanup plan if necessary. 83
3. Physical Infrastructure
Responsibilities for various pollution control and prevention
infrastructure investments were split among various stakeholders.
Tanners were only specifically charged with adopting relatively low-cost
pollution control measures, namely sedimentation tanks urgently
needed to prevent city sewers from clogging within four months, and
two pollution prevention strategies: recycling tanning liquors and
recycling chromium (both within 11 months).8 4 A larger set of
signatories -SEDUE,
the Center for Investigation and Technical
Assistance in Tanning and Shoemaking (Centro de Investigaci6n y Asesoria
Tenol6gica, en Cuero y Calzado (CIATEC)), the National Association of
Tanners (Asosiaci6n Nacional de Curtidores (ANACU)), and tanners -were
made responsible for installing less well-defined "equipment needed to
comply with discharge standards" within 20 months. 85 Finally, SEDUE,
the state of Guanajuato, and tanners were responsible for making the
investments needed for environmentally friendly solid waste disposal
86
within 15 months

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. cls. 2d-3d; see also id. c. 6, tbl.
Id. cl. 4.
Id. cl. 7.
Id. cls. 8-9.
Convenio I, supra note 11, c. 6, tbl.
Id.
Id.
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4. Civic Infrastructure
As representatives of the tanneries, three trade associations CICUR, ANACU, and the Association of Chemists and Technicians of
Le6n (Asociaci6n de Qufmicos y Ticnicos de Le6n (AQTCL))- were charged
with verifying that tanners installed sedimentation tanks, informing
tanners of applicable laws, and promoting the installation of pollution
87
control and prevention equipment.
5. Analysis
Given the lack of regulatory capacity in 1987, even a welldesigned voluntary agreement aimed at enhancing pollution control
probably would have been difficult to implement successfully. However,
several features of the 1987 convenio appear particularly impractical.
First, the convenio mandated sizable pollution control investments at
hundreds of tanneries, a solid waste disposal solution, and improved
capacity for monitoring, enforcement, and administration.88 By making
SAPAL responsible for meeting federal effluent standards, it also
89
implicitly mandated building a municipal wastewater treatment plant.
Yet, the convenio lacked any provisions for financing other than a
statement that the three federal signatories would "assist polluters in
securing funding for the implementation of necessary measures." 9°
Second, the convenio deferred important issues to an advisory
committee that had little chance of resolving them. For example, the plan
mandated the installation of equipment and infrastructure needed to
meet emissions standards, but it left to the advisory committee decisions
about what specific investments to mandate and how to finance them. 91
Moreover, the advisory committee had no clear legal authority or fiscal
foundation and was made up of a hodgepodge of representatives from
16 institutions. 92 Third, the timetable for completion of the tasks
mandated by the pollution control program was exceedingly ambitious:
all tasks were scheduled to be completed in under two years. 93 Fourth,
the document was internally inconsistent in that it required tanneries to
comply with existing environmental law but also charged SEDUE,
SARH, and SSSS with establishing emissions standards. 94 Finally, the
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. cls. 6, 7, 10.
Id. c. 6, tb.
Id. cl. 4.
Convenio I, supra note 11, c. 3d.
Id. cls. 6,8, tbl.
Id. c. 7.
Id. c. 6, tb.
Id. cls. 2d-3d, cls. 5-6, tbl.
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tanning sector as a whole, not a specific representative of the sector, was
responsible for several critical elements of the program, including investments in chromium recycling, solid waste disposal, and the installation
of equipment needed to comply with emissions standards. 95
Not surprisingly, none of the first convenio's key goals were
achieved. Sedimentation tank use barely increased over the 21-month
period contemplated by the convenio, the specified pollution and waste
control measures were not implemented, and authorities did not define
standards for discharges. As a result, in 1989, the convenio's original
term was extended for another two years. However, this period saw only
one significant accomplishment: the installation of sedimentation tanks.
Among a sample of 137 tanneries surveyed in 2000, 52 percent had
installed a sedimentation tank by 1991.96
C. Convenio II
1. Background
By 1991, Mexico's environmental regulatory infrastructure had
improved but was still fundamentally inadequate, especially at the
municipal level. The main accomplishments between 1987 and 1991 on
the federal level were the passage of a new comprehensive
environmental law (LGEEPA) in 1988 and the creation of the National
Water Commission (CNA) in 1989. 97 At the local level, key milestones
were passage of the Guanajuato State Environmental Law in 1990 and
the creation of the Guanajuato State Water Commission (CEASG) in
1991.98
The second convenio was signed on October 24, 1991. 99 It was
meant to restart the effort to control tannery pollution after four years of
inaction and the failure in 1991 of ECO-AZUL, a private-sector effort to
replace hundreds of tanneries in Le6n with a single large facility that
would use environmental controls. 100 The second convenio was candid
about the lack of progress during the first convenio -its stated goal was
95. Id. cl. 6, tbl.
96. Original survey data collected by the authors.
97. See generally L.G.E.E., supra note 36; Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, supra note 29,
ch. 2.
98. Ley de Ecologia para el Estado de Guanajuato [Law of Ecology for the State of
Guanajuato], supra note 56; Decreto Gubernativo Nfimero 16 [Gubernatorial Decree
Number 16], supra note 57.
99. Convenio II, supra note 11, at 8. The second convenio is less formal in its structure
than the first-it is introduced as a minuta [memorandum]. As such, it is rather
haphazardly constructed and is not divided into numbered clauses.
100. Interview with Carlos Oliverio, supra note 47.
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to "determine the actions necessary to follow up on the first convenio"
given that there had been "no significant advances." 1°1 The signatories to
the second convenio differ slightly from those of the first convenio (Table
1). The main points of the second convenio are as follows (Table 2).

Topic
Legal Infrastructure
Standard setting

Table 2. Provisions of the Four Convenios
(P Key Provision)
I
II
IIn
Gul. 1987)
(Oct. 1991)
(un. 1995)
N Federal
signatories to set
new tannery
effluent
standards

Institutional Infrastructure
Enforcement
P.SAPAL to
enforce liquid
effluent
standards

Registration

101.

* Not addressed

* Federal,

state, and city
authorities to
set zoning
rules

* No concrete

provisions

P0Tanners to
register with
city authorities

Convenio II, supra note 11, at 1, 3.

IV
(Mar. 1997)

0 City to set
standards for
discharges into
sewers
o CNA to set
standards for
discharges into
rivers

* City to set

0-State to pass
laws to make
SAPAL
responsible for
regulating
discharges into
sewers

* State to pass

IOTanners to
register with
SAPAL and
submit
compliance
plans
P Tanners to
register with
INE as
hazardous
waste
generators

standards for
discharges into
sewers
* CNA to set
standards for
discharges into
rivers
NoAuthorities to
establish new
regs. on tannery
solid wastes

laws to make
SAPAL
responsible for
regulating
discharges into
sewers
o City to publish
records of
enforcement
activities
* Tanners to
register with
SAPAL and
submit
compliance plans
* Tanners to
register with INE
as hazardous
waste generators
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I
(ul. 1987)
New committees
* Committee
established to
analyze and
finance
pollution control
projects
_Physcal Infirastructure
Pre-treatment
0 Tanners to
install
sedimentation
tanks and
recycling
o SEDUE and
tanners
responsible for
unspecified pretreatment
investments

II
(Oct. 1991)
* No concrete
provisions

III
(Jun. 1995)
o No concrete
provisions

IV
(Mar. 1997)
- Committee
established to
monitor
compliance with
convenio

* No concrete
provisions

o No concrete
provisions

Relocation

N Tanners to
relocate wetblue processes
to authorized
industrial
zones.
Authorities to
define zones
* Not
addressed

* Not

• Wastewater
segregation and
common effluent
treatment plants
to eliminate need
for individual
investments at
plants in
authorized
industrial zones
o Tanners to pay
fees for
wastewater
treatment
o Tanners to
relocate wet-blue
processes to
authorized
industrial zones

Industrial parks

o Not addressed

* Not addressed

Municipal
wastewater

* SAPAL

Solid waste

* Federal and

charged with
meeting federal
standards

state authorities
responsible for
unspecified
investments

1SAPAL to
build
wastewater
treatment
plant within 2
years
o-Tanners to
finance new
solid waste
disposal
facility

addressed

• Parque PIEL
to build
treatment plant
within 2 years
* SAPAL to build

wastewater
treatment plant
within 1 year

* No concrete
provisions

* Treatment

facilities to be
built in
authorized
industrial zones
o SAPAL and
city to build
wastewater
treatment plants
within 1 year
* State and INE
to build
disposal site
* Tanners to
obtain
hazardous
waste permits
from INE
o Tanners to
finance new
solid waste
disposal facility
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(Table 2 continued)
Topic

I

II

(Jul. 1987)

(Oct. 1991)

Civic Infrastructure
Tannery
* CICUR,
Representation
ANACU, and
AQTCL

Education &
research

• Not addressed

III

(Jun. 1995)

CICUR and
ANACU

* CICUR and

* Not

N City to finance
education &
research center
NoFederal, state,
and municipal
authorities to
establish trust
fund for
environmental
research
DPublic
education on use
of municipal
sewer

*

addressed

ANACU

1029

IV

(Mar. 1997)
• Tanners may
join
individually;
non-joiners face
immediate strict
enforcement
* Public
education on
use of municipal
sewer

2. Physical Infrastructure
Represented by CICUR and ANACU, the tanners agreed to
relocate the wet-blue stages of the tanning to authorized zones reserved
exclusively for industry and to install unspecified pre-treatment facilities
needed to comply with effluent standards. 1° 2 The purpose of the
relocation was primarily to facilitate private investments in common
effluent treatment plants - treatment plants shared by more than one
tannery. 103 The deadline for relocation was five years.' °4 The tanners
committed to building and then utilizing a solid waste disposal
facility. 105 Finally, SAPAL was charged explicitly with designing a
wastewater treatment plant within one year and building it within two
years. 106
3. Legal and InstitutionalInfrastructure
Federal, state, and municipal authorities jointly committed to
legally define the boundaries of the authorized industrial zones to which
tanners were to relocate. 1° 7 Also, the tanners agreed to register with
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 5-7.
Interview with Carlos Oliverio, supra note 47.
Convenio II, supranote 11, at 5-6.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 4.
Id.
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municipal authorities (stating their plans for relocation and abatement)
and again pledged to promote compliance with all applicable pollution
control regulations. 108
4. Analysis
The second convenio introduced two important new strategies:
registering all tanneries and relocating tanneries to industrial zones
where they could build common effluent treatment plants, and explicitly
assigning responsibilities for constructing a wastewater treatment plant
to SAPAL. 1°9 Despite these innovations, the second convenio suffered
from many of the same failings as the first. Critical financing issues were
not addressed. Also, gaps in regulatory infrastructure created
bottlenecks. The convenio hinged on relocating tanneries to authorized
zones, but the necessary first step of defining authorized zones did not
actually occur until seven years later in 1998, and, as discussed below,
the first industrial park did not become operational until 2001.110 Perhaps
not surprisingly then, none of the objectives of the second convenio were
met.
D. Ecological Industrial Park of Le6n
In late 1992, following the tannery relocation strategy introduced
in the second convenio, federal, state, and municipal authorities
provided seed capital for the Ecological Industrial Park of Le6n (Parque
Industrial Ecol6gico de Le6n (PIEL)), a new tannery industrial park that
was to include a common effluent treatment plant. The plan was to sell
250 lots in the park to large-scale tanneries to recoup the initial
investment. By 1994, seed funding had been used to acquire unimproved
agricultural land south of the city. Progress on improving this land was
far slower than anticipated and, as a result, so was the relocation of
tanneries to the park.111 It was not until 2001, when the municipal
government contributed 12 million pesos in financing, that PIEL's
electric power substation was completed. 112 By the end of 2002, only a
108. Id. at 5-6.
109. Id. at 5-7.
110. Regalamento de Zonificaci6n Uses del Suelo de Municipio de Le6n, Gto., supra
note 71.
111. Interview with Carlos Oliverio, supra note 47; Ignacio Veldsquez, La Crisis Frena la
Compra de Terrenos en el ParqueIndustrial Ecol6gico, HERALDO DE LEON (Mex.), Apr. 12, 1999,
at 7.
112. Sandra Muftoz VAzquez, Con Una Inversi6n de 12 mdp Terminardn Subestaci6n
Eldctrica del Parque Piel [The Electric Substation of the Piel Park will be completed with a 12
million pesos Investment], CORREO DE HOY (Mex.), Sept. 4, 2001, at 18.
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dozen lots were physically occupied, with several buildings still under
113
construction.
E. The Presade Silva Bird Die-off
By early 1994, efforts to control tannery pollution in Le6n had
almost completely stalled. However, a widely publicized ecological
calamity rekindled progress. In October and November 1994, tens of
thousands of native and migratory aquatic birds died while wintering at
a reservoir called the Presa de Silva,114 located 35 kilometers downstream
from Le6n. A common suspicion was that industrial pollution
originating in Le6n was the cause. 115 By December 1994, national and
international media were covering the story. In June 1995, six months
after the incident, the Audubon Society and two Mexican
nongovernmental organizations petitioned the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation (CEC), a trilateral body set up under the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, to
investigate.116 The CNA and researchers from the Universidad Nacional
Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM), Mexico's largest university, also
conducted studies of the incident. 117 The CEC report made a link
between the die-off and industrial pollution in Le6n.118 Among the
report's recommendations were treating and recycling industrial
effluents by building an industrial park with the requisite equipment. 119
Although an internationally financed reclamation project eventually
restored the reservoir and international interest soon waned, the bird
die-off greatly increased local concerns about tannery pollution. 12° A few
years later, the reservoir and adjacent lands were made a protected
natural area by the state.121
113.
114.
115.
116.

Visit to PIEL by the authors, fall 2002.
Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, supra note 10, at 1.
Id. at 12.
Id. at l.

117. COMISION NACIONAL DEL AGUA, REPORTE DE AVANCE DE LA INVESTIGACION PARA
DETERMINAR LAS CAUSAS DE LA MORTANDAD MASIVA DE AVEs EN LA PRESA DE SILVA EN EL

ESTADO DE GUANAJUATO (1995) (cited in COMM'N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION SECRETARIAT,
supra note 10); M. GOMEZ Ruiz & C. HUMBERTO, MORTANDAD DE AYES MIGRATORIAS, PRESA
DE SILVA, GUANJUATO (Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mexico, Facultad de Quimica)
(1995) (cited in COMM'N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION SECRETARIAT, supra note 10).
118. Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, supra note 10, at 4.
119. Id. at 63-69.
120. Interview with Azuela, supra note 19; Interview with Oliverio, supra note 47;
Interview with Oyarvide, supra note 27.
121. Decreto Gubernativo Nfimero 80 [Gubernatorial Decree Number 80], PERI6DICO
OFICIAL DEL ESTADO DE GUANAJUATO, Segunda Parte, 16 de Enero de 1998 (Mex.).
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F. Convenio III
1.Background
The years between the second and third convenios (1991 to 1995)
were marked by a number of significant legal and institutional
developments, which were discussed in section III. Regulations were
promulgated for hazardous wastes in 1993.122 The federal environmental
regulatory authority was restructured in 1992 to create SEDESOL,
PROFEPA, and INE, and in 1994 to create SEMARNAP. 123 On the local
level, PIEL was incorporated in 1992.124 Finally, a contract to build a
municipal wastewater treatment plant in Le6n was granted to ECOSYS
III in 1994.2
In February 1995, at the height of the Presa de Silva controversy,
the CNA and Guanajuato state authorities created the Turbio River
Comprehensive Clean up Program (Programa de Saneamiento Integral del
Rio Turbio), a commission meant to jump-start efforts to cut tannery
pollution in Le6n.1 26 The commission met four times in spring and early
summer to hammer out a new covenant, which was signed at the
commission's fifth meeting on June 16, 1995.127 Signatories to the 1995
convenio once again included top federal, state, and local officials (Table
1). The convenio consisted of 12 clauses that contained the following
substantive elements (Table 2).
2. Legal and InstitutionalInfrastructure
Many of the legal and institutional provisions of the third
convenio repeat or amplify those of the previous two. The city of Le6n
and the state of Guanajuato committed to creating the legal and
institutional infrastructure that SAPAL would need to regulate
discharges into municipal sewer systems. Specifically, the city of Le6n
was to compile an inventory of industrial facilities discharging into the
sewer system, promulgate regulations governing such discharges, and
establish "administrative systems" to enforce these regulations, while the
state of Guanajuato agreed to undertake the legal reforms needed to
authorize SAPAL to monitor and enforce compliance with these
regulations. 128 The third convenio also included provisions aimed at
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See NOM-CRP-001-ECOL/93, Anexo 2, § 4.2; NOM-CRP-006-ECOL/93.
Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, supranote 29, ch. 2.
Interview with Carlos Oliverio Pantajo, supra note 47.
Decreto Nfimero 281, supra note 67, § 3.
Interview with Oliverio, supra note 47; CEC, supra note 10, at 23.
See Convenio III, supra note 11.
Id. §§ 4b, 5a-b, 5d.
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putting into place the legal infrastructure that the CNA would need to
regulate discharges of municipal wastewaters into the Turbio River.
Specifically, the CNA committed to establishing specific standards for
such discharges by June 30, 1995; making an inventory of such
discharges by July 31, 1995; and intensifying monitoring and
enforcement of the national water laws.129 The tanners -represented in
all provisions of the convenio by CICUR, ANACU, and the National
Industrial Chamber of Commerce (Cdmara Nacional de la Industria de
Transformaci6n (CANACINTRA))- agreed to register with SAPAL and
present a pollution control plan.130 They also agreed to register with INE
as solid waste generators and to comply with the hazardous waste
treatment procedures 131 to be outlined in a new compliance document.
3. Physical Infrastructure
SAPAL and the city of Le6n again committed to building a
municipal wastewater treatment plant for Le6n along with the required
water mains. 32 The CNA was charged with monitoring compliance with
this obligation. 33 PIEL, for its part, committed to building a treatment
plant and to begin operating it by July 1997.134 The city of Le6n pledged
to guarantee financing for the plant and to "support" the relocation of
tanneries to the park. 135 SAPAL agreed to operate the PIEL treatment
plant.136 Finally, the convenio included vague and non-committal
137
provisions regarding in-house treatment facilities in tanneries.
Specifically, the representatives of the tanners agreed to "ensure that the
tanning industry continues mitigating the environmental impacts of the
tanning process and the disposal of its wastes and avoids emitting
pollutants through the use of wastewater treatment plants, thus
reinforcing pollution prevention programs in the Turbio watershed." 138
4. Civic Infrastructure
Provisions regarding civic infrastructure focused on registration,
education, and research. The city of Le6n agreed to finance an education

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. § 3.
Id. § 9d.
Id. § 9e.
Id. § 6b, c.
Convenio III, supra note 11, § 3e.
Id. § 10a.
Id. § 5f, k.
Id. § 6b.
Id. §§ 9c, 12.
Id. § 9c.
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and research center. 139 SEMARNAP, the state of Guanajuato, and the
municipality of Le6n were to contribute equal shares toward a trust fund
that would finance research on local environmental issues, particularly
water pollution. 140 A local nongovernmental organization, Fundaci6n
Ecol6gica de Guanajuato A.C. (FUNDAE), was charged with compiling
relevant existing information and research, liaising with other
organizations for this purpose, and promoting environmental awareness
at the educational center.141 Finally, SEMARNAP, the state, and the
municipalities all made vague general commitments to educate citizens
about environmental issues and, in particular, the need to keep toxic
substances out of municipal sewers. 142
5. Analysis
While the 1995 convenio repeated several provisions of earlier
convenios, it also completely ignored initiatives that were centerpieces of
these convenios, in particular relocating tanneries to industrial parks and
building a solid waste disposal facility. The 1995 convenio also
introduced several new measures: the CNA was to establish specific
standards for and to monitor wastewater discharges into the Turbio
River watershed, SAPAL was to be legally empowered to enforce
pollution control laws, the city of Le6n and SAPAL agreed to take a
number of steps to promote PIEL, and tanners were to register with INE
and comply with new hazardous waste requirements. 143 Finally, unlike
the agreements that preceded it, the third convenio emphasized
education and research and included plans to establish a center and a
trust fund to support these activities. 144
Several of the problems that characterized earlier convenios are
evident in the 1995 agreement. Once again, important financial
obligations are ill-defined, most notably those concerning effluent
treatment and relocation. 145 Additionally, the convenio does not
acknowledge, much less resolve, inconsistencies that were likely to
create bottlenecks. For example, SAPAL was charged with meeting
standards for discharges into national waters, despite the fact that

139. Id. §§ 5h, 11.
140. Id. § 8.
141. Id. §11a.
142. Id. §§ 2a, 4c, 5e.
143. Id. §§ 3, 4b, 5a, b, d, 6b, 9e.
144. Id. §§ 5h, 8.
145. SEMARNAP agreed to provide "support to firms seeking financing"; the state
committed to "financially support the municipalities' clean up initiatives"; and
municipalities agreed to "support the relocation of firms to Parque PIEL." Id. §§ 2c, 4a, 5f.
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standards for discharges into its sewer system had yet to be
established. 146 Similarly, tanners were charged with abiding by a manual
describing their obligations regarding hazardous waste, even though no
147
such manual existed at the time.
The 1995 convenio had some positive impacts but ultimately
failed to significantly enhance pollution control. SAPAL made a
concerted effort to register tanneries and make them commit in writing
to a pollution control plan. By February 1996, 217 tanneries had
submitted a form committing them to one of eight pollution control
options. 148 A second positive impact was an effort to inform tanners of
the relevant legal standards and procedures needed for compliance. In
149
1996, CIATEC produced a document detailing this information.
Although this document faithfully describes the existing regulation, it
reflects the gaps and weaknesses of that regulation and leaves open a
number of important questions about how the regulations apply to
tanneries. SAPAL, in collaboration with federal and state regulators,
undertook a more ambitious project -producing a document explaining
in plain language how federal hazardous waste regulations apply to
leather tanneries and making recommendations for handling,
transporting, and storing tannery wastes. 150 However, this manual was
not completed and distributed until December 1997, nine months after
the fourth convenio. Lastly, the education and research initiatives never
151
materialized because financial resources were not made available.
G. Convenio IV
1. Background
Although only 20 months passed between the third and fourth
convenios, a number of developments significantly enhanced regulatory
capacity in Le6n during this period. In 1996, two new state regulatory
institutions -IEEG and PPAEG - were established and LGEEPA, the
federal environmental law, was revised to promote further

146. Id. § 6a.
147. Id. § 9e.
148. S. Naya Reynaud, Proyecto de Saneamineto de Aguas Residuales Domdsticas e
Industriales de la Ciudadde Le6n, Guanajuato, 62 DINAMICA DE LA CURIDURfA 9, 9-10 (1996).
149. CIATEC, APPtNDICE ECOLOGICO PARA LA INDUSTRIA DEL CUERO 13-45 (1996).
150. INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ECOLOGIA (SEMARNAP) ET AL., MANUAL PARA LA
CLASIFICACON Y MANEJO DE LOS RESIDUOS DE LA CURTIDURfA (1997).

151. Interview with Bi6l. Robert Avifia Carlin, Director of FUNDAE, in Guanajuato,
Gto. (July 15,2002).
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decentralization of environmental authority, to establish the right of
152
access to environmental information, and to modernize regulation.
The stated purpose of the fourth convenio was once again to
clean up the Turbio River watershed. 5 3 The signatories were more or
less the same as those of the third convenio, with some exceptions (Table
1). New signatories included IEEG and PPAEG, while old signatories
that dropped out included FUNDAE. Longer than the preceding three
convenios put together, the 1997 convenio consists of 16 clauses
containing the following substantive elements (Table 2).
2. Legal and InstitutionalInfrastructure
The parties once again promised to finish promulgating liquid
waste regulations. As in the previous convenio, the state of Guanajuato
committed to undertake the legal reforms needed to enable SAPAL to
monitor and enforce water pollution laws, and the city of Le6n agreed to
formulate standards for discharges into sewers. 154 The CNA pledged to
conclude the studies needed to set standards for direct discharges into
the river by SAPAL and industries by July 1997.155 With regard to
hazardous waste, authorities agreed to complete the aforementioned
compliance manual and the tanners agreed to submit applications for
permits to INE 30 days thereafter. 5 6 The signatories also pledged to
establish a working committee to monitor compliance with the convenio
and to handle disputes. 57 Both the CNA and the municipal authorities
were once again charged with developing a list of industrial wastewater
dischargers 5 8 Finally, tanners agreed to register with the local water
59
authority and to register with INE as generators of hazardous waste.
3. Physical Infrastructure
The key innovation of the 1997 convenio was a plan to build a
series of specialized treatment plants for tanneries. Specifically,
individual tanneries were to segregate their effluents by inorganic
pollutant (salt, sulfur, and chromium) and pipe them through dedicated
sewer lines to the corresponding treatment plant. 16° SAPAL was charged
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Decreto Nlimero 16, supra note 57; Decreto Nfirnero 28, supra note 57.
Convenio IV, supra note 11.
Id. §§ 6b, 7c.
Id. § 31.
Id. §§ 4, 10g.
Id. §§ 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.
Id. § 3c.
Convenio IV, supra note 11, § 7b.
Id. § 8b.
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with designing, building, and operating these treatment plants by July 1,
1999.161 Because the plants would only service authorized industrial
zones, tanneries outside of these zones agreed to either (1) stop
producing wet blues within one year, (2) relocate to authorized zones, or
(3) install the pretreatment equipment needed to meet SAPAL's
forthcoming standards for discharges into the sewers. 162 With regard to
solid and hazardous waste, the state once again committed to creating a
disposal facility, this time within three months. 163 The state also agreed
to develop plans to rehabilitate sites contaminated by improper disposal
of hazardous wastes.64 Regarding municipal wastewater treatment (i.e.,
treatment of organic pollutants), SAPAL and the municipality of Le6n
committed to building a plant. The deadline was set at January 1998 for
construction and April 1998 for operation. 165
Who was to finance these investments? Tanners pledged to pay
fees that would facilitate the construction of treatment facilities. 166 The
city of Le6n agreed to provide land for the new industrial wastewater
treatment plants. 167 The state, municipalities, and SAPAL committed to
"support" relocation of the tanneries to industrial parks.168 Although
most of the language was noncommittal, SAPAL was charged with
building new sewer mains needed to segregate effluent streams as well
as the associated infrastructure for the industrial parks, all while
adhering to a strict timeline. 169
4. Civic Infrastructure

The city of Le6n agreed to carry out information campaigns on
the dumping of toxic substances into sewers and to strengthen
educational centers (by unspecified means).170 In addition, the
municipality was to issue monthly reports on fines imposed by
PROFEPA for violations of environmental standards in the city. 17'

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id. § 10i, j, k, 1.
Id. § 6g, f.
Id. § 6h.
Convenio IV, supranote 11, § 8a.
Id. § 10b.
Id. § 7k.
Id. §§ 6e, 7i, 8c.
Id. § 8b.

170.

Id. § 7e, g.

171.

Convenio IV, supranote 11, § 7o.
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5. Miscellaneous
Two miscellaneous provisions of the convenio are noteworthy.
First, while trade organizations represented the tanners in the previous
three convenios, individual tanners were invited to sign the 1997
convenio. 172 There was an important incentive: PROFEPA would apply
less pressure on tanners who signed. 73 Second, INE agreed to promote
economic incentives for reducing tannery pollution, including an
exemption from tariffs on imported pollution control equipment and
accelerated depreciation of environmental investments. 174
6. Analysis
In many respects, the fourth convenio simply restated provisions
from earlier convenios. However, there were also a number of important
innovations. First, the convenio moved toward resolving a key sticking
point in earlier convenios: assigning responsibility for investments in
industrial wastewater treatment. In previous convenios, tanners
themselves were allocated the lion's share of this burden, a provision
that practically guaranteed that they would not cooperate. The 1997
convenio established a plan that relieved tanners of the responsibility for
financing up-front construction costs. The local sewer authorities would
finance and build the dedicated sewer mains and industrial wastewater
treatment plants and would recoup some of the costs through treatment
fees. 175 However, tanners outside of approved industrial parks would
still need to relocate in order to have access to the effluent treatment
plants.
Second, the 1997 convenio was intended to ratchet up pressure
for compliance. Individual tanners were invited to sign the convenio and
pledge to adhere to its provisions. 176 Also, the municipality was charged
with issuing monthly reports on the number and amount of
environmental fines. 177
Although these innovations represented some degree of
progress, the 1997 convenio was plagued by many of the same problems
and internal inconsistencies as the first three convenios. Most important,
although relocating tanneries to industrial parks was the lynchpin of the

172.
173.

Id. § 10h.
Speech by Rafael Arriaga, Director of IEEG, to a CICUR Extraordinary Assembly,

77 DINAMICA DE LA CURIDURIA (May 1997).

174.
175.
176.
177.

Convenio IV, supra note 11, § 10i, j, k, 1.
Id. § 10b.
Id. § 10h.
Id.§ 7o.
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clean-up strategy, it was still not clear who would pay for the relocation
expense or even where these parks would be sited since the only
industrial park that existed at the time was PIEL. Furthermore, although
tanners agreed to comply with regulations for industrial wastes, a
manual on these regulations had not yet been published and a
hazardous waste facility still had not been built. Finally, the timing of
several of the provisions within the covenio was extremely ambitious.
In the three-and-a-half years prior to the convenio's expiration in
November 2000, no progress was made on its single most important
provision-building industrial wastewater treatment plants. Thus, the
fourth convenio, like the preceding convenios, failed to have a significant
impact on industrial wastes from tanneries. The only real progress that
occurred during the term of the fourth convenio resulted from initiatives
that had long been in the works. SAPAL finally promulgated standards
for discharges into the city sewers in February 1998.178 In addition, on the
day that the convenio expired, SAPAL's municipal wastewater treatment
plant finally came on line. 179
IV. CONCLUSION
We have sought to answer two questions: why did
environmental regulators in Le6n make voluntary agreements the
centerpiece of their efforts to control tannery pollution during the 1980s
and 1990s, and why did these agreements fail to achieve almost all of
their objectives? The historical information presented in sections 3 and 4
suggests that a single factor - significant gaps in the infrastructure
needed to enforce conventional command-and-control environmental
policies-is the key to answering both questions.
Exactly what environmental regulatory infrastructure was
needed to enforce command-and-control policies and what
infrastructure was missing? The requisite legal infrastructure included
clear regulations governing both discharges of liquid wastes into
municipal sewers and the handling and storage of hazardous solid
wastes. The former were not promulgated until 1998. Although
hazardous waste regulations were promulgated in 1993, written
materials clarifying how they applied to tanneries were not available
until 1997.
The institutional infrastructure needed to regulate tanneries
included capable state and municipal regulatory authorities, yet
178. Reglamento de Uso de la Red de Alcantarillado del Sistema de Agua Potable y
Alcantarillado de Le6n, Gto., supra note 64.
179. Fue InauguradaPlantade Tratamientode Aguas Residuales, supra note 68.
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Guanajuato's environmental regulatory agency was not established until
the mid-1990s, Le6n's water and sewer authorities were not founded
until 1985, and a municipal environmental authority was not established
until the next decade.
The physical infrastructure needed to control tannery pollution
included facilities to treat inorganic liquid wastes (salt, sulfur, and
chromium), organic liquid wastes, and hazardous solid wastes. Of these
three types of infrastructure, to date, only one -a facility to treat organic
wastes- has been built and it did not begin operating until 2000.
Finally, the civic infrastructure needed to control tannery
pollution included public support for-or at least acquiescence toregulation of tanneries in Le6n. This infrastructure is difficult to
measure. However, there is no evidence that the citizens of Le6n have
ever placed significant political pressure on tanners to improve pollution
control. Nor is there much evidence-aside from the Presa de Silva
incident in the winter of 1994/1995-that environmental advocacy
groups have pressured tanners.
Given these
gaps in regulatory
infrastructure, local
environmental management authorities had limited ability to employ
conventional regulatory tools in Le6n. Voluntary regulation likely
represented the only available means of addressing an urgent and
increasingly politically sensitive environmental problem.180
We hypothesize that, in addition to motivating the voluntary
environmental agreements in Le6n, a lack of environmental regulatory
infrastructure also undermined them. It did so in three ways. First, it
implied that the cost of constructing the physical infrastructure needed
to control tannery pollution was daunting since it had to be constructed
from scratch. For example, except for in-house facilities in a handful of
tanneries, infrastructure for treating industrial wastewater in
metropolitan Le6n did not, and still does not, exist. All of the various
options for building such infrastructure -in-house individual treatment
plants, common effluent treatment plants for groups of tanneries along
with infrastructure needed to connect the tanneries to the treatment
plants, and relocating tanneries to industrial parks- are exceptionally
costly. Although they contain vague, non-committal language about
public-sector financial assistance, the four convenios implicitly assigned
responsibility for these investments to the tanners (only the fourth
convenio split responsibility between tanners and municipal authorities).

180. A more cynical -and not necessarily mutually exclusive-interpretation is that the
convenios provided political cover to local regulators who were unable or unwilling to use
conventional regulatory tools.
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Tanners were unlikely to undertake these investments without strong
incentives.
Second, the obvious lack. of environmental regulatory
infrastructure implied that regulators could not create such incentives in
the typical fashion: threatening polluters with mandatory regulation if
they failed to comply with voluntary commitments. Indeed, the 20-year
history of efforts to control tannery pollution summarized here is notable
for the almost complete absence of enforcement actions against tanners
(the only exceptions being consistent enforcement of rules mandating
sedimentation tanks and much more sporadic enforcement of rules on
illegal dumping of sludge). As each failed convenio was followed not by
sanctions, but by a new convenio, the credibility of the threat of
meaningful enforcement further diminished.
Third, the lack of a wide range of interdependent regulatory
infrastructure virtually guaranteed that bottlenecks would arise, and,
moreover, that the signatories to the voluntary agreements would dodge
their commitments by making their own compliance contingent on that
of others. For example, the ability of regulators to meet key
commitments such as promulgating discharge standards and financing
wastewater treatment facilities was constrained by a host of factors
including a chronic scarcity of fiscal resources and the slow pace of the
federal and state legal and institutional reforms needed to create
effective municipal regulations and regulatory institutions. These
failings provided tanners with excuses-as well as valid reasons-for
abrogating their own commitments to invest in pollution control.
Hence, key themes from previous research on voluntary
regulation in industrialized countries clearly apply to the Le6n
experience, but with an important twist. As the industrialized-country
literature suggests, regulators in Le6n likely resorted to voluntary
agreements because they lacked the capacity to enforce mandatory
regulations, and these agreements floundered in large part because firms
did not face a credible "background threat" of more stringent mandatory
regulation. The caveat concerns the types of pollution problems
addressed by voluntary regulation in industrialized countries versus
Le6n. In industrialized countries, voluntary regulation almost always
complements command-and-control policies and therefore is typically
used to create incentives for firms to "overcomply" with pre-existing
mandatory regulations, that is, to reduce emissions of conventional
pollutants below mandated levels or to cut emissions of unconventional
pollutants like greenhouse gases that are not covered by mandatory
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regulations. 181 In Le6n, by contrast, regulators used voluntary regulation
to boost compliance with command-and-control policies covering
conventional water and solid waste pollution that were ill-defined,
incomplete, and infrequently enforced. Instead of overcompliance,
voluntary regulation in Le6n aimed at simple compliance. One
implication was that the stakes for the success of voluntary
environmental agreements in Le6n were relatively high.
What are the implications of our case study for other developing
countries? Although further research is needed, intuition suggests the
poor performance of voluntary regulation in Le6n is not likely to be an
unusual outcome. In our view, the same two factors that drove this
lackluster performance -gaps in regulatory infrastructure and the use of
voluntary regulation to improve compliance with "mandatory"
regulations-are frequently observed in developing countries.
Unfortunately, our case study suggests that voluntary regulatory policies
(at least negotiated agreements of the type used in Le6n) are not likely to
prove a particularly effective tool for shoring up poorly performing
command-and-control regimes in developing countries.

181.

Lyon, supra note 4.

